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Corporate Distributions—Liquidating and Dividend 
by ERNEST H . KENYON 
Principal, Omaha Office 
Presented before the 10th Annual Institute on Taxation of the Texas So-
ciety of Certified Public Accountants, Houston and Dallas—October 1963 
ONE OF T H E definitions of pitfall is "a danger, difficulty, or error 
into which one may fall unsuspectingly." There is a connotation 
here of blamelessness or innocence. This is the meaning intended 
when the word is used with reference to the shareholders. 
A pitfall has also been defined as "a snare for the unwary," 
and unwary as being "careless, heedless, or not vigilant." It is in 
this context that the term will undoubtedly be applied if it is used 
with reference to trouble spots that should have been avoided by us 
in our role of professional advisors. 
The decision rendered by the Western District Court of Louisiana 
in Bancroft v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America is par-
ticularly in point. 
T. P. Bancroft was the owner of controlling stock in two corpo-
rations. On two separate occasions he sold stock of one company to 
the other. Before the sales he had been assured in writing by his 
certified public accountants that the transactions would not result 
in any income tax liability. Although this was not reported as a 
tax case, it is apparent that one corporation was used to redeem the 
stock of a related corporation. Under such circumstances, sections 
304 and 302 may be applicable, and the corporate distribution can be 
considered equivalent to a dividend. Such treatment was evidently 
appropriate with respect to the proceeds of the Bancroft sales because 
subsequently, as a result of the transactions, he was required to pay 
income tax deficiencies exceeding $35,000. 
Mr. Bancroft brought action to recover the additional assessment 
from the accountants' professional liability insurer and won his case. 
The presiding judge discounted the contention that accountants were 
not qualified to answer questions of tax law and stated that the court 
was protecting innocent clients against a CPA's professional negli-
gence. 
BASIC PROBLEMS 
The basic problems in this area of corporate distributions can 
be stated in terms of both cause and effect. As to cause, we are 
concerned with— 
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1) a failure to recognize a corporate distribution as such, or 
2) an incorrect presumption that a corporate distribution would 
qualify as a payment either in redemption of stock or in 
partial or complete liquidation of the company. 
The effect of the first problem could be the attribution of dividend 
income where none was expected; and of the second, the imposition 
of dividend or ordinary income treatment where capital gain was 
presumed. 
The problems might be reduced still further to two basic ques-
tions. 
1) Is there a distribution? 
2) If so, how should it be taxed? 
The questions serve only to put the problems into focus, since 
the answers must be tailored to fit each situation as it arises. 
Approach to Problems 
Probably the most important prerequisite toward developing the 
proper answers is a familiarity with the statutory provisions. It is 
essential that the distribution problems be identified with applicable 
code sections. However, it must be recognized, at the same time, 
that the language of the Internal Revenue Code is frequently so 
broad as to be of little help in many instances. 
As a matter of fact, the shortage of specific guidelines is the very 
core of this discussion. 
We know that, in order for a distribution to be taxed as a divi-
dend, the corporation must have earnings and profits. 
We know from the Regulations that a bargain purchase can 
create a dividend problem and that, likewise, the cancellation of 
stockholder debt can result in dividend treatment. 
The rules of certain specific redemption and liquidation situa-
tions are sufficiently well set forth in the law so that planned results 
are possible. 
A substantial volume of court decisions has established that, 
with respect to the taxability of dividends, they need not be pro rata, 
a formal declaration is not essential, and the payments do not have 
to take the commonly recognized form of a dividend. 
Al l of these are positive assertions. They are illustrative of 
what can be relied upon when analyzing distribution problems. 
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"Essentially Equivalent to a Dividend" 
The best example of nebulousness, on the other hand, is in the 
Code's frequent use of the words "essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend." This phrase, or some variation of it, has been part of tax 
law for more than forty years. In 1920, the Supreme Court, in the 
Macomber case, held that the then existing law taxing stock dividends 
was unconstitutional. This opened the door to tax avoidance through 
bailouts; consequently, Congress, in its Revenue Act of 1921, pro-
vided that if, after distributing a stock dividend, a corporation re-
acquired its stock "at such time and in such manner as to make the 
distribution and cancellation or redemption essentially equivalent 
to the distribution of a taxable dividend. . ." the amount received 
would be so taxed. 
Although since then it has also been used countless times in the 
language of court decisions, the phrase often produces more questions 
than answers. It defies specific application. It is representative of 
the undefined area in which are concealed many pitfalls. 
Since vulnerability in this area cannot be precisely measured, 
we must draw on case histories and published rulings for appropriate 
guidelines. Problem transactions are too numerous to permit a 
comprehensive coverage, but a review in retrospect does provide a 
selection of pertinent cases in the following areas: 
1) constructive dividends 
2) redemptions 
3) partial liquidations 
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS 
The term is used with reference to situations resulting in a 
dividend tax, where the recipient was unaware that such treatment 
was imminent or even possible. The taxpayer could be vulnerable as 
a result of conditions that have existed for many years. 
Related Businesses Conducted Together 
The direct impact of the imputed dividend is often borne by the 
corporation rather than by the stockholders, by virtue of the fact that 
the income had been reported by the shareholders, but as something 
other than a dividend. Good examples of this may be found in the 
cases of banks and related insurance agencies. In a typical situation, 
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the insurance purchased by bank customers is written through an 
agency operated by bank officers or employees. The two businesses 
are normally conducted under the same roof and more often than not 
the agency has never been charged for its use of the facility. 
Such was the case with the Bank of Kimball.1 Before 1951 it had 
operated an insurance agency in Kimball, South Dakota. In January 
of that year, the directors resolved that all commissions on insurance, 
auction sales, and rents should be removed from the bank's earnings 
for the coming year. Effective with 1951, and with no further formal-
ity through 1956, the agency profits were distributed directly to seven 
stockholders and directors, each of whom reported his share for 
income tax purposes. In December of 1956, a formal partnership 
agreement was executed and, beginning with 1957, partnership 
returns were filed annually. 
The court sustained a determination of the Revenue Service 
that the bank should be taxed on agency profits for the years 1954, 
1955, and 1956. Returns for the preceding three years were protected 
by the statute of limitations. 
This problem is not restricted to bankers. Moke Epstein, Inc.,2 
operated an automobile dealership, and its president, Morris Epstein, 
as an individual, sold automobile insurance. The Internal Revenue 
Service attempted unsuccessfully to tax the commissions to the cor-
poration, maintaining that the income to Mr. Epstein represented 
dividends. 
Some of the factors to be considered in a case of this type were 
well set forth in First Security Bank v. U. S.,3 which was also decided 
for the taxpayer. Items in support of the bank's contention that the 
insurance agency was a separate entity were enumerated as follows: 
1) the existence of a partnership, 
2) the regular filing of a partnership tax return, 
3) a bona-fide business purpose for operating the agency as a 
separate entity and lack of evidence of tax avoidance, 
4) the maintenance of a separate bank account and separate set 
of books, 
5) the carrying on of correspondence and other communications 
in the name of the partnership on stationery and forms 
bearing the agency name, and 
1 Bank of Kimball 9 A F T R 2d 573 (DC SD 1962) 
2 Moke Epstein, Inc., 29 T C 1005 (1958) 
3 First Security Bank v. U. S., 11 A F T R 2d 856 (DC Mont. 1963) 
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6) the lack of control by the bank through any action of its board 
of directors. 
Factors listed as supporting the government's position were: 
1) common personnel, 
2) common premises, 
3) payment by the bank of the entire salaries of all bank officers 
and employees who devoted part of their time to the insur-
ance business, and payment of all other expenses of the 
agency as well, 
4) the failure to pay any consideration for the transfer of the 
assets, 
5) the participation by the agency in excess loans without the 
payment of interest by the bank, and 
6) the distribution of profits in the same proportion as stock 
ownership. 
Although a preponderance of plus factors in the First Security 
Bank case resulted in a victory, the fact that the trial was made neces-
sary by the existence of the negative items should not be overlooked. 
This is always true, of course, when issues are not clear-cut and 
there are opposing points of view. 
The Revenue Service has become increasingly active in this area, 
possibly motivated by the realization that even where the activities 
cannot be combined, some allocation of expenses may be appropriate. 
Where related but separate businesses are conducted under the 
same roof, the importance of well-defined entities and an arm's-length 
philosophy of operation should be emphasized. 
Significance of Separate Corporate Entity 
Many shareholders fail to appreciate the significance of the sepa-
rate corporate entity. The writer was personally acquainted with 
an old gentleman who, many years ago, transferred investment stocks 
to a newly created holding company. Our Firm was engaged by him 
to help contest a very substantial deficiency attributable, in part, to 
his withdrawal of some of these same shares. Almost to the day he 
died, he insisted that since he had put the stocks into his company, 
he should be able to take them out without incurring a tax liability. 
Many bargain purchases reflect a lack of understanding of the 
degree of separateness of the corporate structure. The shareholders 
recognize that a withdrawal of property without consideration may 
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be labeled a dividend, so they circumvent this by purchasing the 
property—but at an amount less than fair value. One current contro-
versy, which may get to court, concerns the purchase of all of the 
stock of a subsidiary by the stockholders of the parent. The initial 
investment was $25,000 and this was the price paid by the stock-
holders about eight months later. The shareholders, in turn, subse-
quently sold the stock to unrelated parties for $200,000. As a conse-
quence, the Treasury Department has proposed deficiencies based on 
an alleged $175,000 bargain. The principal argument for the share-
holders under the specific circumstances, relates to the valuation at 
the time of their purchase. 
The inability or refusal to recognize the separate pocketbook 
of a corporation is responsible for many compensation cases. For 
example, the C. J. Duffey Paper Co.4 paid $1,800 annually as com-
pensation and directors fees to the sister of the president of the 
company, despite the fact that she had rendered little or no services 
and attended no directors meetings during the years in question. At 
least, this is what the court determined in the absence of any con-
vincing evidence to the contrary. 
The taxpayers had claimed that the sister, who lived in an ad-
joining state, had served as a contact to help expedite orders from 
suppliers in that area. If this were so, the company should have re-
quired the sister to submit written contact reports, expense state-
ments, and other correspondence. Since she did not, the salary pay-
ments were disallowed as deductions and taxed as dividends to Mr. 
Duffey and his wife. It is not inconceivable that, had the annual 
compensation to Mr. Duffey's sister been greater than $6,000, the 
subject of gift taxes might have been added to the issues. 
In Schner-Block Co., Inc.,5 the directors of the company, Charles 
Schner, Jr., his wife and his mother, orally agreed to pay the widowed 
mother a pension of $200 a month for life. The company had no pen-
sion or death benefit plan, and had never made similar payments to 
any other employee's widow. The mother had never worked for the 
company. The action was never reflected in the minute books. The 
payments were not contractual. Because of this complete lack of 
documentation, the taxpayer was not able to present a convincing 
argument. 
4 Duffey v. Lehert, L L A F T R 2d 1317 (DC Minn. 1963) 
5 Schner-Block Co., Inc., T C Memo. 1963-166 
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Stockholder Loans 
One gets the impression from reviewing some cases that tax-
payers have taken a so-called calculated risk without realizing the 
extent of the risk. In many instances, when a stockholder borrows 
money from his wholly owned corporation, he must be aware that a 
simple withdrawal would be taxable to him; otherwise, no reason 
exists for the debt classification. Since the necessity for the indebt-
edness has obviously been recognized, it is difficult to understand 
why so many stockholder-owners fail to perfect the debt. 
This is not to imply, however, that establishing a valid debt, by 
itself, will solve the problem. 
Mr. and Mrs. E. W. Chism6 withdrew from their corporation (in 
addition to salaries) about $48,000 over a five-year period. Although 
the withdrawals were recorded as "E. W. Chism—Notes Receivable," 
no notes were executed nor any other written instructions given. 
The accounts were unsecured, bore no interest, and were not repaid. 
The Commissioner determined that the withdrawals constituted a 
distribution of informal dividends and was sustained both by the Tax 
Court and by the Ninth Circuit. It was interesting to note that, before 
the Tax Court's decision but subsequent to Mr. Chism's death in late 
1956, someone apparently recognized the necessity for establishing 
the existence of the debt and the matter was brought before the 
Nevada Probate Court, which ruled that the withdrawals gave rise 
to an enforceable claim by the corporation against the estate. This 
decision was introduced as support to the taxpayers' contentions. 
The Circuit Court acknowledged the effectiveness of the Probate 
Court's holding, but added, "But it is not the existence of a legal 
obligation to repay that is controlling. It is petitioners' intent to 
honor, and the intent of their collective alter ego, the corporation, 
to enforce that obligation which determines the nature of the with-
drawals." 
The Tax Court's memorandum decision earlier this year in 
Fender Sales, Inc.7 stated similarly, "The fact that the corporation 
reflected the withdrawals in the form of a receivable is not a con-
trolling factor and particularly so when the withdrawer is in control 
of the corporation. This same reasoning applies to the execution of a 
promissory note, since the executing and collection of the $40,000 
6 Estate of E. W. Chism, 12 A F T R 2d 5300 (CA-9 1963) 
7 Fender Sales, Inc., T C Memo. 1963-119 
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note were, for all practical purposes, under the control of Fender." 
On the basis of a great many court decisions on this issue, it 
would appear that a stockholder could safely borrow from his con-
trolled corporation—even at something less than complete arm's 
length. For instance, the corporation might grant the loan at a time 
when a commercial lender would be reluctant to do so; or the loan 
may be on an unsecured basis whereas a bank would insist on col-
lateral, but the debt must be an honest one. In many cases other 
than those cited, considerable weight has been given to the form of 
the transaction. A promissory note with stated maturity and bearing 
interest at commercial rates is bound to be more favorably regarded. 
When a stockholder loan is looked at retrospectively, however, there 
is no substitute for a showing of repayment. 
In a given situation, a successful contention on the loan issue 
may be analogous to winning a skirmish, but the battle might still 
be lost. The making of loans to shareholders could, of itself, precipi-
tate a proposed deficiency based on section 531, and in any event 
would be considered adversely in a determination of whether or not 
earnings had been accumulated unwarrantedly. 
Rent 
It would appear that the directors of Fairmount Park Raceway, 
Inc.,8 were tempting fate when they agreed to pay 100 per cent of 
profits as rent for race track facilities to a partnership comprised of 
the corporation's shareholders or their relatives. The Revenue Serv-
ice, relying on an expert's comprehensive study of track rentals, was 
sustained in its determination that excess rents amounting in the 
aggregate to almost $1 million should be taxed to the individuals as 
dividends. 
Advertising 
W. D. Gale, Inc., an electrical contractor, deducted as advertising 
expense the cost of maintaining and operating racing boats. The 
deduction was denied and the disallowed amounts were taxed to 
the company's president, Joseph A. Schoenith,9 as a constructive 
dividend. 
Summary 
These cases are illustrative of the broad area encompassed by 
the term dividend. The use of corporate funds for personal benefit is 
8 Fairmount Park Raceway, Inc., T C Memo. 1962-14 
9 Joseph A. Schoenith, 9 A F T R 2d 344 (CA-6 1961) 
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too easily rationalized by controlling shareholders. Many of these 
situations need the detached look that a certified public accountant 
can give. It is up to us to recognize and to point out the problems 
and to suggest appropriate solutions. This is good tax practice. 
REDEMPTIONS 
The frequency of adverse court decisions relating to redemptions 
is puzzling. Possibly the payment of tax on capital gains is naively 
accepted as an insurance of immunity against additional taxation; or, 
the fact of having surrendered stock shares in return for the distri-
bution has effectively rationalized the taxpayer's position. Whatever 
the reasons may be, it is apparent that too many shareholders resort 
to redemptions as convenient solutions to the problem of siphoning 
profits from a corporation. Often, when subsequent examination has 
led to proposed dividend treatment, taxpayer rebuttals have been 
weak. 
In Henry and Bessie Silver,10 the court considered the following 
criteria in arriving at its decision in favor of the Commissioner. 
1) Did the corporation adopt any plan or policy of contraction 
of its business activities? 
2) Did the corporation follow an orderly procedure looking 
towards its ultimate dissolution or its ultimate contracted 
operation? 
3) Did the initiative for the corporate distribution come from 
the corporation, based on usual considerations, or did it 
come from the stockholders for their own purposes? 
4) Is the proportionate ownership of stock by the stockholders 
changed? 
5) What were the amounts, the frequency, and the significance 
of dividends paid in the past? 
6) Does the capitalization, at the time of the purchase of the 
stock, represent capital paid in or earnings from the busi-
ness? 
7) Was there a sufficient accumulation of earned surplus to 
cover the distribution, or was it partly from capital? 
8) Was there maintenance of an approximately similar amount 
of capital liability, or did that figure decrease to a degree 
somewhat comparable to the purported distribution of 
capital ? 
10 Henry Silver, 11 A F T R 2d 871 (DC Mont. 1963) 
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9) Was there good faith or bad in the action of the Board of 
Directors in making the distribution? 
10) What was the net effect of the action taken? 
In the opinion of the court, the last-mentioned item was the most 
important. 
The answers to virtually all of these questions were prejudicial 
to the taxpayers, and they lost their case. The decision was rendered 
under the 1939 Code, but the underlying philosophy has been carried 
forward into present law. 
The decision in Eva D. Bradbury11 by the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit reflects the provisions of the 1954 Code. 
A business purpose was introduced by the taxpayers as support 
to the contention that a distribution in redemption of stock by a 
family-owned corporation was not essentially equivalent to a divi-
dend, pursuant to section 302(b)(1). The Court was advised that the 
redemption was made to extinguish a liability of Mrs. Bradbury to 
the corporation, at the suggestion of the company's banker, from 
whom a loan had been requested. 
On the basis of all of the facts submitted, and noting that Mrs. 
Bradbury's constructive ownership of stock had decreased only from 
91 per cent to 90 per cent, the Court rejected this argument and sus-
tained the dividend treatment of the distribution amounting to ap-
proximately $22,500. 
CPA Can Be Unwitting Accomplice 
Early last summer a client and the writer had lunch together for 
the purpose of discussing in general the subject of redemptions. The 
requirements of the substantially disproportionate test and the con-
sequences of complete redemption were outlined, and some of the 
business purposes that had been accepted by the courts as prevailing 
over a presumption of dividend equivalence were noted. The writer 
recalls mentioning that several cases had been won by taxpayers who 
had redeemed stock to provide shares for resale to key employees. 
The luncheon guest was the vice-president of a closely held pros-
perous manufacturing concern. The directors had resisted the pay-
ment of dividends although the surplus accumulation was substantial. 
A few weeks later, the writer was advised that the corporation 
was about to redeem 150 shares of the president's stock for $45,000, 
11 Eva D. Bradbury, 9 A F T R 2d 398 (CA-1 1962) 
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representing its approximate book value. The alleged purpose of the 
redemption was to provide shares for sale to department heads. Two 
of them had already committed themselves to the purchase of ten 
shares apiece. 
It was apparent that after the redemption the president and his 
immediate family would still own more than 75 per cent of the out-
standing stock, that stock would not be offered to other employees, 
and that the twenty-share commitment was about all the two depart-
ment heads would be able to purchase in the foreseeable future. Al l 
in all, this was a poor transaction. The president was about to with-
draw profits under the guise of a redemption, which he expected to 
justify with a business purpose the writer had provided—the result 
of an informal discussion. CPAs should be careful of the role of 
accomplice they may play in these schemes. 
Ten-Year Agreement 
A redemption of all shares owned by a stockholder shall be in-
demnified against dividend treatment (resulting from attributed own-
ership), provided the selling shareholder retains no interest in the 
corporation other than that of creditor, does not acquire any interest 
except by inheritance within ten years, and files an agreement to 
notify the secretary if any such interest is acquired within the ten-
year period. The regulations require that the agreement be attached 
to a timely filed return for the year of redemption. 
There is some disagreement about the proper consequence of a 
delinquent filing of this statement. The Tenth Circuit has indicated 
in Van Keppel12 that a delinquent submission preceding a deficiency 
assessment and not rejected by the Director was timely. On the other 
hand, the Third Circuit has held in the Estate of Blanche E. Archbold13 
that a filing three years after the redemption was sufficient cause for 
negation of the waiver of the constructive ownership rules, and, as 
a result, dividend treatment was imposed. 
Shoestring Purchases 
In an appropriate circumstance, a redemption may be used effec-
tively as part of a stock-purchase transaction. When a stock acqui-
sition is contemplated, but the purchaser cannot meet the asking 
price, corporate funds might be used to redeem the shares that the 
12 G. W. Van Keppel, 63-2 U C T C 9683 (CA-10) 
13 Estate of Blanche E. Archbold, 11 A F T R 2d 422 (CA-3 1963) 
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new stockholder was unable to buy. This is an example of a shoe-
string purchase. 
Precautions should be taken with respect to both the purchaser 
and the seller. 
The purchaser should buy all of the stock covered in his commit-
ment. The corporation should not be permitted to assume any part 
of his obligation, in spite of the fact that Rev. Rul. 59-286, in one 
situation, has permitted such an assumption. After reviewing an 
extremely complicated statement of facts, the Eighth Circuit deter-
mined in Edgar S. Idol14 that the purchaser's personal obligation to 
the seller was paid by the corporation; as a result, the Circuit Court 
sustained a determination of the Tax Court that constructive divi-
dends had been received. 
From the seller's standpoint, the sale should precede the re-
demption. This timing could be important. If the redemption were 
the first transaction to be completed, the selling shareholder might 
not be able to show that his surrender of shares was substantially 
disproportionate or he might conceivably be trapped by the attri-
bution rules of section 318. 
Although the redemption was not prompted by shoestring pur-
chase considerations, an example of the operation of section 318 is 
found in Thomas G. Lewis15 in which the Tax Court stated, "Had this 
case arisen under the predecessor provisions of the 1939 Code, it might 
have been possible to find that the redemption was not essentially 
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, . . . ." 
Redemption to Pay Death Taxes 
Section 303 relates to the redemption of stock to pay death taxes. 
The provision has application after the death of a shareholder where 
the value of stock in the corporation owned by the decedent is more 
than 35 per cent of his gross estate or more than 50 per cent of his 
taxable estate. Stock in two corporations can be used, if the gross 
estate includes more than 75 per cent in value of the outstanding stock 
of the two companies. 
The percentage requirements represent potential hazards to a 
contemplated redemption, inasmuch as the effectiveness of this device 
is made dependent on accurate and reliable valuations, not only of the 
stock of the redeeming corporation but of all of the other assets in 
the estate. For this reason, it would be desirable, whenever possible, 
14 Edgar S. Idol, 12 A F T R 2d 5118 (CA-8 1963) 
15 Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T C 71 (1960) 
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to delay any redemption under this section until after the estate tax 
audit has been completed. The applicable time limit for completing 
the transaction is ninety days after the statute has run on the estate 
or, if the Tax Court has been petitioned to determine an estate tax 
deficiency, sixty days after its decision becomes final. 
The immunization from dividend treatment is limited in amount 
to the aggregate of death taxes and duties plus funeral and adminis-
trative expenses, but the proceeds of the redemption do not have to 
be used for those purposes. 
In any contemplated section 303 redemption, consideration might 
be given to the distribution by the corporation of appreciated prop-
erty (except LIFO inventory, instalment obligations, etc.), in which 
case the benefits might be compounded. 
The scarcity of court decisions on the section 303 redemptions 
may be a reflection of a general reluctance to gamble on the valuation 
questions; on the other hand, since this is one of the few distribution 
situations for which specific guidelines have been provided, it may be 
that, despite a frequent use of these provisions, disputes have not 
arisen. 
Redemption Through Use of Related Corporations 
"Section 304 was enacted in the 1954 Code to close loopholes in 
the tax laws deriving from transactions involving brother-sister 
corporations." This is borrowed from the language of the court's 
opinion in U. S. v. Collins.16 
R. Perry Collins and his wife, Marjorie, owned all of the stock 
in Permar Corporation. They also owned 70 per cent of the stock of 
R. P. Collins & Company, Inc., the remaining 30 per cent being owned 
directly by or in trust for their daughters. In September 1954, the 
R. P. Collins & Company, Inc. (which had an earned surplus at the 
time of approximately $523,000) purchased for $15,000 all of the stock 
of Permar Corporation. 
This represents a classic section 304 application. A retrospective 
look to determine the net effect of this transaction would lead to the 
conclusion that the taxpayers had siphoned $15,000 in profits from 
their corporation without really giving up anything in return. Oddly 
enough, the Massachusetts District Court did not take this position. 
It held for the taxpayers on the basis of the following logic : 
a) The R. P. Collins & Company, Inc.'s surplus was not 
diminished as a result of the purchase; 
16 U. S. v. Collins, 9 A F T R 2d 1119 (CA-1 1962) 
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b) the corporation received stock worth the $15,000 paid 
for it; 
c) the individual shareholders received the $15,000, but 
parted with property of equal value. 
An acceptance of this theory would make sections 302 and 304 
inapplicable whenever stockholders sold to a related corporation at 
a fair price. Under such circumstances, section 304 could not justify 
its own existence. 
The First Circuit, reversing the lower court's decision, referred 
to Radnitz v. U. S.,17 wherein it was stated, "After the dust has settled, 
one finds the plaintiffs and their fellow stockholders as firmly en-
sconced in their tri-corporate position as was true prior to the stock 
transaction, with admittedly no true diminution of interest or control 
despite their transfers of stock." 
Accumulation Penalty 
Any contemplation of a redemption transaction should include 
some consideration of the vulnerability of the corporation to the 
penalty tax on unreasonable accumulation. If the decision in Pelton 
Steel Casting Co.18 were considered to be the dominant authority, the 
very act of redemption would expose a corporation to the tax under 
section 531. 
However, the more recent conclusions drawn by the court in 
Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc.19 are much more compatible. The 
opinion in this case flatly stated that the fact of redemption, of itself, 
furnished no basis for imposition of the section 102 (now section 531) 
tax. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that the same court declared, 
"We need not say that under no circumstances may a stock purchase 
be relevant to a question arising under Section 102 of the 1939 Code. 
When it is done out of cash accumulations which reasonably may be 
thought excessive, such a purchase, along with other factors, may be 
considered appropriately in arriving at ultimate findings." 
Redemptions do focus attentions on accumulated earnings, and 
if an accumulation problem exists, this fact must be given weight 
among the items considered in arriving at a decision. 
PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS 
Section 346 assures capital gain treatment for redemptions re-
ceived in connection with certain defined corporate contractions. If 
17 Radnitz v. U. S., 7 A F T R 2d 423 (DC N.Y. 1960) 
18 Pelton Steel Casting Co., 1 A F T R 2d 542 (CA-7 1958) 
19 Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc., 6 A F T R 2d 5910 (CA-4 1960) 
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a given transaction appears to fall within the provisions of section 
302 also, section 346 will prevail. This can be very helpful, because 
then we need not be concerned with disproportionate redemptions or 
attribution or even section 306 dispositions. We must, of course, 
conform to the provisions of section 346, but if the circumstances fit, 
compliance is made easy. 
If the contemplated transaction does not, in all respects, meet the 
specifications for automatic capital gains treatment, the business con-
traction must be sufficiently prominent in the plan to protect the 
distribution from attack as being essentially equivalent to a dividend. 
This may not be so easy. In Estate of Chandler,20 the corporate opera-
tor of a general department store reduced its operation from five de-
partments to one; its floor space from more than 8,000 square feet to 
1,800; its employees from an average of fifteen to five; yet the court 
held that a redemption of 50 per cent of the corporation's stock was 
a dividend to the shareholders. 
By their very nature, distribution problems often involve sub-
stantial amounts of money. They merit very careful considerations 
on our part. One way to ensure acceptance is to obtain a ruling from 
the Internal Revenue Service. The filing of such a request may delay 
the transaction, but if circumstances permit, the assurance is well 
worth waiting for. 
CONCLUSION 
Only a few of the pitfalls existing within the broad area of corpo-
rate distributions have been touched on in this discussion. The Code 
sections mentioned are replete with other problems. There are many 
potential pitfalls in other distribution problems outside the scope of 
this paper, such as those related to spin-offs and other divisive re-
organizations, transactions including boot, section 306 and section 341. 
Our area of responsibility is very great. 
Rulings 
20 Estate of Chandler, 48 A F T R 842 (CA-6 1955) 
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